Abstract-Since the wireless sensor network (WSN) is limited by power, computation capability and storage resources, it is difficult for the existed cryptographic schemes which are based on the traditional symmetric or public key cryptography to adapt to these restrictions. Till now, most studies are based on the Elliptic Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), however, which have heavy energy consumption and cost much verification time, they are still not suitable for the WSN. Thus it is necessary to find a new cryptography to provide the security for the WSN. In this paper, firstly, we propose a light-weight rainbow signature (LWRS) scheme based on Shamir's minus method, and the performances of it has been evaluated with respect to the memory and computation time. Secondly, by choosing the proper number of variables, we use the scheme between the nodes or between the WSN and the business platform of the internet of things. Meanwhile, we set up the layer of the LWRS the same as that of the cluster WSN. That is, the ordinary node has the lowest energy and corresponds to the first layer of the LWRS scheme. Finally, we give the security analysis of the LWRS scheme. More specifically speaking, by choosing the appropriate number of oil-vinegar variables, our scheme can resist general attacks, rank reduction attacks and oil-vinegar attacks, etc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor network (WSN) has drawn much attention since last decade [1] [2] [3] [4] , and has wide range of applications, including military and tracking, equipment and human monitoring. Generally speaking, sensor network consists of large numbers of sensor nodes, which are battery-powered. With this special characteristic of the WSN, it has to face an important challenge on the security of the WSN, especially in the applications of the internet of things. Since many sensor nodes are deployed in unattended environment, they are under the threat of various attacks. So an adversary can easily exhausted the energy of sensor nodes and manipulate the message by injecting bogus data or altering the contents of legitimate messages. Also, the adversary can easily impersonate other nodes. Hence, integrity protection and authentication mechanisms need to be taken into consideration.
To resist the above attacks, it should analyze the existing cryptography and check whether the schemes are suitable for the WSN, and find that symmetric cryptography is attractive as of its energy efficiency, but the security is his big drawback. Meanwhile, the public key cryptography is not suitable to provide the security for WSN, for which has the limited power. Recently, some studies have been appeared, most of them are based on the Elliptic Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [5] [6] [7] , however, which have heavy energy consumption and cost much verification time, they are still not suitable for the WSN. Thus it is necessary to find a new signature scheme to protect the integrity and authenticity of the WSN.
Fortunately, Multivariate Polynomials Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) [8] has received much attention, and it has increasingly been seen as a possible alternative to number ECC-based cryptosystems. For it has higher computationally efficiency than number theoretic-based schemes, it is more suitable for the WSN. The principal idea of the MPKC is to choose a multivariate system F, which is quadratic polynomial and can be easily inverted. In this system, the F is named as central map; S and T are two affine linear invertible maps which can hide the structure of central map F. The public key of this scheme is the composed map P S F T =   , which is hard to be inverted. The private key of the cryptosystem consists of S, T and F. Till now; there are several trapdoor constructions to build the central map F, such as Big Field schemes including Matsumoto-Imai [9] , HFE [10] and single field schemes like UOV and rainbow [11] . The rainbow multivariate signature scheme is considered as a secure model against many attacks. Currently, the rainbow signature has been used in the WSN. In this paper, firstly, we propose a light-weight rainbow signature (LWRS) scheme based on Shamir's minus method, and the performances of it has been evaluated with respect to the memory and computation time. Secondly, by choosing the proper number of variables, we use the scheme between the nodes or between the WSN and the business platform of the internet of things. Meanwhile, we set up the layer of the LWRS the same as that of the cluster WSN. That is, the ordinary node has the lowest energy and corresponds to the first layer of the LWRS scheme. Finally, we give the security analysis of the LWRS scheme. More specifically speaking, by choosing the appropriate number of oilvinegar variables, our scheme can resist general attacks, rank reduction attacks and oil-vinegar attacks, etc.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the rainbow signature scheme. In Section 3, we propose a light-weight rainbow signature (LWRS) scheme. In Section 4, we apply the LWRS scheme to the WSN. In Section 5, we analyze the security and efficiency of the proposed LWRS scheme by comparing with the schemes based on ECDSA. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
II. REVIEW RAINBOW MULTIVARIATE SIGNATURE SCHEME
Rainbow multivariate signature scheme [12] is an asymmetric signature scheme based on Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Scheme (UOV), which is a variant of oilvinegar scheme [13] . It can improve the efficiency of the original UOV scheme and outperform in terms of its running time and the length of the public key [14] . The essence of the rainbow signature is that it is a multi-layer UOV. The general construction of rainbow signature is introduced as follows [12] .
Let S be the set { } 
which are oil-vinegar-type polynomials where The rainbow signature scheme is defined as follows: Public Key: (1) The field K, including its additive and multiplicative structure; (2) The composed map
Signature Generation:
To sign a document d, we need to find a solution of the equation
can be done in the following steps:
( 
Ⅲ. LIGHT-WEIGHT RAINBOW SIGNATURE SCHEME
We now describe a new digital signature scheme. It uses a variant of rainbow signature scheme to sign the messages. And we call the sampled rainbow signature which combined with the Shamir's minus method [15] as the light-weight rainbow signature (LWRS) scheme.
In order to construct a LWRS scheme, first, we must choose an oil-vinegar map as the central map, then, choose an invertible affine map :
to hide the central map. Last, the composition generates the quadratic map
. Now we describe the LWRS scheme as follows:
The public key consists of the following items:
(1) The field K, including the additive and multiplicative structures;
(2) The map F F L =  . We apply the Shamir's minus method to F in the LWRS scheme, deleting the last δ components. So we will have a new map for the LWRS scheme
Private Key:
The private key consists of the follow items:
(1) The invertible affine bijective map :
be the message to be signed.
First, the signer computes If the equation holds, the signature is valid; otherwise, we reject the signature.
Ⅳ. LWRS SCHEME FOR WSN

A. LWRS for clustered WSN
In the WSN, to increase the efficiency and ensure the scalability of the network operations, the sensors are often grouped into clusters. In the clustered WSN, the nodes and their neighbourhood's are organized into a cluster in which the resource-rich node is designated as the Cluster Head (CH) [16] [17] [18] . The ordinary nodes (ON) belonging to the same CH collect the data. The CH uses an aggregation scheme to aggregate these data and sends them to the sink node which also named base station (BS). Last, BS accepts stores, handles data and produces output message to the business platform of the internet of things. In the process of the above communication, an adversary may imitation a sensor node and may compromise the security of the communication in the whole WSN. In order to solve these problems, the WSN can be signed as a whole, and the BS sends the signature to the platform who can verify the signature. If the signature is valid, the WSN is secure; otherwise, if the signature is invalid, the WSN may be compromised. LWRS scheme is a better choice for the security of the WSN. Like the rainbow signature, LWRS is layered. And corresponding to the clustered WSN, the LWRS can be divided into three layers. Because the ON has the weakest energy, while the BS has the strongest energy, so according to the different energy of the nodes, the first layer of the LWRS can be used for the ON, the second layer is used for the CH, and the top layer is used for the BS. The data collection of the clustered WSN and the number of the variables in LWRS is depicted in Fig 1: Taking into account the energy of the WSN and the security of the LWRS scheme, we choose the field The private key consists of 13 polynomials with 17 vinegar variables and 13 oil variables, 13 polynomials with 30 vinegar variables and 13 oil variables and the affine transformations L. The total number of the coefficients for the private key is about 1398, that is, about 14KB of storage.
Signature Generation:
In the WSN, to sign a message The process of the signature is depicted as figure 2: B. LWRS for nodes WSN is used for communication among sensor nodes, while in the process of the communication, the adversary may impersonate a sensor node to communicate with other node or compromise the security of the whole WSN. Because power supply for nodes is limited and this is to be hard replaced, energy conservation becomes a key problem for signature, so in order to protect the integrity and authenticity, the LWRS scheme is a good choice, for it has smaller length of signature, smaller public key and smaller private key, that is, it has a higher efficiency. The stage of signature generation is the same as that of the above section, the only difference is that the whole signature is done by a single node who should
, and the versification will be done by another node rather than the platform. ( , , , , , , , , ) 
Ⅴ. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE LWRS SCHEME
Till now, several methods have been proposed to attack the rainbow signature scheme. LWRS is a scheme which is the improvement of the rainbow signature. So the possible methods which attack to the rainbow signature may threaten to the LWRS. We should deal with the attacks one by one.
A. General Attacks
The most natural method used to attack the rainbow signature is to solve the associated polynomial equations directly, that is, the adversary should find the plaintexts from the given ciphertexts only by using the public key itself. In the case of LWRS, the central map is the oilvinegar polynomial which is an MQ problem over 8 (2 ) GF . However, it is known that solving this problem is NP-hard not only over (2) GF [19] but also over any field [20] . To solve this problem, many methods have been proposed, for instance, the XL-family algorithms or the Grobner basis [21] , F4 and F5 algorithms [22] , DR algorithms [23] , etc. Fortunately, all the above methods can not work in our LWRS scheme.
The construction of the LWRS is essentially the same as that of rainbow signature. The largest difference is that the LWRS does not have the left affine map, but adds the schamir's minus method to this scheme. In our LWRS, first, F F L =  , according to [20] , how to find F and L from F is an IP problem; this is a NP-hard problem. Second, in the process of the signature, δ oil variables can be randomly chosen, this can enhance the nonlinear degree of the LWRS and increase the difficulty of finding the preimage. When using the LWRS for the WSN, the scale of the parameters which are randomly chosen can avoid this 
B. Rank Reduction
The birational permutation signature scheme of Shamir is used to be broken by the method of rank reduction method. Because the polynomials usually span the space into several components which have a flag of spaces V + is exactly one. As to this problem, through analysising the last space, the adversary can easily find the flag of spaces.
When using the LWRS for the WSN, although the LWRS has three layers and it is suit to this style: 1
, the adversary may use rank reduction to attack it, the rank reduction has no advantage to solve it, because the difference of that of 2 V and the dimension of 1 V is 1 O , which is 13, but not 1. In one word, the last layer of the oil variables is thick enough to resist this attack.
C. Attack on Oil-Vinegar
The purpose of using map L is to hide the central map, that is, to mix the F . The LWRS for WSN has three layers in which the second layer is built upon the first layer, and each component of the cipher F belongs to the second layer which has 30 vinegar variables and 13 Oil Variables. That is, the adversary may discover the variables of the oil-vinegar by attacking the second layer. However, the complexity of the method is 
D. Minrank Attack
The idea of the minrank is that the adversary attempt to search for the polynomial whose associated matrix has the lowest rank. As the LWRS has multi-layers, and the second layer is built upon the first one, the polynomial must be in the first layer. So the adversary may analyze the first layer to attack the scheme.
When using the LWRS for the WSN, the first layer of ON has 17 vinegar variables and 13 oil variables. In order to attack this scheme, first, the adversary should get the bilinear form associated with each polynomial, which has an associated 43 43 × 
D. The Attack Using the Structure of Multi-layers
If the cipher consists several independent parallel branches, we can separate the variables to make each polynomial of the cipher derived as a linear combination of polynomials. This is the method of attacking the scheme by using the structure of multi-layers.
When using the LWRS for the WSN, although the LWRS has several layers, they are not independent, for each layer is built upon the previous one. Hence, although the adversary attempts to attack the polynomials of the BS and wants to make use of the parallel independent branches, it does not work. Similarly, the attack will not work here due to the fact that the polynomials of the BS are not independent to the CH's.
Ⅵ. COMPARISON
The ECDSA is about 160 bit security level, the wellestablished RSA has at least 1024 bit security level, although they are seemly close to the suitable signature, they are still very long for most WSN need. The LWRS with about 80 bit security level is superior to these schemes, better suit to the WSN, because the LWRS only use the multiplication and addition operations, other than exponentiation and bilinear operations, so the efficiency of the LWRS is very high. By comparing with the scheme based on ECDSA, the performances of the LWRS scheme has been evaluated with respect to the memory and computation time [23] . Meanwhile, compared with the ECDSA, the percentage of computation memory is about lesser than 65%, while the time of the signature generation of the rainbow is about 25 times faster. The LWRS which we proposed has smaller length of signature, smaller public key and smaller private key, so the LWRS has a higher efficiency than rainbow, this ensure it most suitable to the WSN. Especially, when the LWRS scheme applied to the clustered WSN, the whole WSN only sign one signature, and the platform verifies the signature, which greatly improved the efficiency.
Ⅶ. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a light-weight rainbow signature (LWRS) scheme based on Shamir's minus method. Compared with the symmetric and asymmetric key techniques, it has higher efficiency and security. Due to the special character of the LWRS and the WSN, we apply the LWRS to the WSN, and give the security and efficiency analysis of the LWRS scheme. 
